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ABSTRACT
The implications of uncertainty for the design of contracts and of
remedies for their breach are studied. After characterizing complete
contingent contracts, incomplete contracts are examined. Specifically,
in view of difficulties in making contingent provisions (costs of enumer-
ation and of bargaining; verification of occurrence of events), it is
shown for which contingencies provisions are made. Then, in the major
part of the paper, two important implicit substitute for contingent terms
are analyzed. The first is provided by remedies for breach of contract;
for when a party must pay damages for breach, he will be induced to fulfill
his obligations in approximately those contingencies which would have been
agreed upon under the terms of a detailed contract. The second substitute
for contingent terms lies in the opportunity for renegotiation in light
of circumstances, since renegotiation will occur in more or less those
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The concern of this paper is with theimplications of uncertainty
for the design of contracts and of remedies for their breach.1Uncer—
tainty is of course an inherent feature of the contractual
relationship,
for by definition there is always a lapse of timebetween the making of
a contract and the promised performance. During thatperiod the cost of
productionmay unexpectedly increase, an offer to the buyer may be made
that is moreadvantageous than the seller's, or any number of other
problematiccontingencies may arise and may result in the seller'sor
thebuyer's failure to perform.
Our analysis of the contractual situation willbegin with. a con-
sideration of agreements which provideexplicitly for such problematic
contingencies. Specifically, a characterization will begiven of con-
tracts which are both complete--contain termsregarding all possible
contingencies--and Pareto efficient--cannot be improved in theeyes of
the buyer and of the seller.
It will next be asked why contractsordinarily should not be ex-
pected to approach true completeness. The explanation will be that
because of certain difficulties in makingcontingent provisions and also
of the existence of various substitutes forthem, it is in the mutual
interests of the parties to leavemany things unstated. Two types of
difficulty in making provisions will be emphasized in thisexplanation:
the Costs of enumerating and of bargainingover contingent arrangements;
and the necessity that a party be able toverify the occurrence of a
contingency claimed by the other party so that a provisiondepending on
the contingency is workable.2 In view of thesedifficulties, it will be
shown for which contingencies contractualprovisions are made.2
Then, in the major part of the paper, two important types of sub-
stitute for contingent terms in contracts will be studied. The first is
provided by legal or customary remedies for breach of contract, that is,
by rules requiring a party in breach to pay money damages to the other
party or perhaps requiring "specific performance." To see why remedies
serve as substitutes for contingent terms, consider, for instance, that
when a seller must pay damages if he defaults, he will be induced t.o do
so only if that still would be advantageous to him, say only if his
production costs were larger than he anticipated or he received a higher
bid than he expected from another party before he was to perform. But
that the seller not perform in such contingencies is probably what would
have been agreed to in provisions for them; and that the seller make a
payment might also have been agreed to in provisions so as to accomplish
a desirable sharing of risk. Thus, remedies for breach can serve as
implicit substitutes for explicit contractual provisions by creating
appropriate incentives to perform, and soi.etimes by allocating risk as
well. The second type of substitute for provisions for contingencies
lies si,mply in the opportunity for renegotiation in light of circum-
stance. The seller who finds that it would be expensive to perform
would usually be willing to pay an amount the buyer would accept for his
release; so, through bargaining ex post, the parties may achieve a
similar result to what they would have written into the contract. A
third type of substitute for contractual provisions should also be
mentioned, but it will only be adverted to in the paper; it is that
certain contingencies (notably, acts of God, force majeure) may already
be recognized in contract law (or trade practice or custom) as• 3
.3 . . . 4 excusing the obligations of one of the parties.
The paper will conclude with a brief commenton the interpretation
of the analysis.
I.Outline of the Model
The concern is with two parties, a buyer anda seller, who each act
so as to maximize the expected utility of a singlevariable, "wealth"5
The parties are assumed already to have met6 andnot to be immediately
able to make contracts with others; thus they will makea contract
themselves if doing so would result in a higherexpected utility for
each than that of the alternative of notmaking any contract, and this
will generally be presumed to be the case. The elementsof the contrac-
tual situation faced by the parties are described inFigure 1. That is,
in order to get the benefits of performance, thebuyer must commit
certain resources before he learns whether the seller willcarry out his
promise. (The buyer might have to hire and train men to be able touse
a machine that is to be delivered; he may have to advertise theexpected
appearance of a singer at his nightclub; he may have to make various
arrangements in anticipation of going on a charter hunting trip.) The
amount of such resources is assumed fixed7 and will be referred toas
reliance expenditures, or simply as reliance.8 Let
r =reliance
and assume that it is positive.
After the buyer "relies," the seller learns the uncertaincon-
tingency. In regard to production contracts, one of twotypes of con-
tract to be studied, the uncertain contingency will be the seller's
production Cost. LetI I
t. Co+ro . ber i ieSIve





f() probability density of c,
where f is assumed to be positive on a non-degenerate interval [ci,J,
with ci0, and to be zero elsewhere.9 The seller is assumed to learn
the production cost before he actually begins the productionprocess.
In regard to contracts for transfer of possession, the othertype of
contract, the contingency will be the value of a bid made by another
party for a good (an object of art; land) that the seller initially has
in his possession. Let
b =bid,
and let f (distributed on [ci, ]) stand for the probability density of b
as well.10 (The next section will discuss whether the buyer is aware of
the bids and would himself be able to sell the good to a bidderwere the
seller to deliver it to him.) It will also be assumed that the seller
would get no value from conswnption of the good; if he does not sell the
good, its worth to him is zero.1'
If the seller satisfies his contractual obligation, that is, if he
"performs," the buyer will enjoy a benefit called the expectancy. Let
v =buyer'sexpectancy,
a positive variable. (This would be interpreted as the enhancement in
profits (gross of reliance) due to delivery of the machine or the ap-
pearance of the singer; it would also be the monetary equivalent value
(gross of reliance) to the individual of going on his hunting trip; it
would be the value (gross of reliance) of the object of art or the-
parcel of land.) The net benefit if the buyer enjoys performance is v -
r.The expectancy is assumed to be known to the parties with certain-
12ty.5
On the other hand, if thesellerdoes not perform, the buyer does
not get his expectancy (so his position is -r), for it Is assumed that
the buyer is not able to purchase immediate substitute performance; the
contract good or service is not traded on a well-organizedmarket.13
II. Pareto EfficientCompleteContingent Contracts
A.The case wherepartiesare risk neutral
In this subsection a complete contingent contract will mean an
enforceable agreement specifying whether or not the seller is to perform
under each contingency and specifying also a price. It will be assumed
that the price is paid when the contract is made and that no monetary
transfers are carried outthereafter.14 Accordingly, a complete con-
tingent contract may be formally identified with a breach set




Now let us define
Eb(B)
=theexpected value--exclusive of price--to the buyer
of a contract with breach set B
E5(B)
=theexpected value--exclusive of price--to the
seller of a contract with breach set B.
Therefore, when price is taken into account, the expected positionsof
the buyer and of the seller who have made a contract are, respectively,
Eb(B) -kand E(B) +k.It follows that a contract (B, k) is Pareto
efficient if there does not exist any other contract (B', k') under
which Eb(B') -k'>Eb(B)
-kand E(B') +k'>E(B)+k.We will
.,.15
denote the breach set of a Pareto efficient contract by B'. Before6
characterizing Pareto efficient completecontingent contracts of the
various types of interest tous, let us first state several facts about
such contracts in general)-6
Remark. A complete contingentcontract is Pareto efficient if andonly
if it is described by either of thefollowing equivalent conditions.
(a) The sum of the buyer's and of theseller's expected values is
maximized by the contract (i.e.,Eb(B)+E (B) is maximized by B*).
(b) The sum of the buyer's and of theseller's values each
contingency is maximized by the contract--the sellerperforms in a con-
tingency if and only if that would increaseor leave equal the sum.17
This implies
psition 1. Under a Pareto efficient productionContract, the seller
will not perform when production Costexceeds the buyer's expectancy
(i.e., B {clc >v}).
Note. The result may be explainedas follows. Suppose that the parties
Contemplated making a contract calling for the sellerto perform in some
contingency where his cost c exceed theexpectancy v. Then the seller
would be willing to accept a reduction inthe contract price sufficient
to induce the buyer toagree to change the contract so as to allow the
seller not to perform in thecontingency. Similarly, a contract allow-
ing the seller not to perform in acontingency where c <vwould be
altered so as to require the sellerto perform in the contingency.
These two statements are in turntrue because there is a loss (in the
sum of values) if either the seller performs whenc >vor fails to
perform when c <v.Reliance r does not affect whether it is Pareto efficient for there
to be performancebecause reliance is like a "sunk cost."
Proof. Bypart (b) of the Remark, it suffices to show that when c >v,
thesum of values is increased by failing to perform. Now iftheseller
doesnot perform, his wealth is k and the buyer's is -k-r,so the sum
is —r.If the seller does perform, his wealth is k -cand the buyer's
is v —k-r,so the sum is v -r-c.Hence the sum is increased by
failing to perform when -r>v-r-cor when c >v.Q.E.D.
In regard to contracts for transfer of possession, two situations
will be distinguished. In the first, it is assumed that bids b are made
only to the seller; they are not available to the buyer; were the good
delivered to him, the buyer could not then sell to the bidder.'8 By
contrast, in the second situation, it is assumed that bids are available
to the buyer; were the good delivered to him, the buyer could sell to
the bidder and would do so if v <b.In both situations it is assumed
for simplicity that if the seller does not perform and sells to the
bidder, then that is the end of the matter; the buyer does not attempt
to make a purchase from the bidder.19
Proposition 2.(a) If bids are made only to the seller, then under a
Pareto efficient contract for transfer of possession, the seller will
not perform when the bid exceeds the expectancy (i.e., B*bjb >v}).
However, (b) if bids are available to the buyer as well, then a contract
in which the seller always performs is Pareto efficient; and, more
-generally,any contract in which the seller performs at least whenever
the bid is less than or equal to the expectancy is Pareto efficient
(i.e., B can be any set which is included in {b b >v}).o
Note. Result (a) is analogous toProposition 1, and is based on the
fact that if either the seller performs whenb >vor fails to perform
when b <v,there is a loss in the sum of values. Result(b) is differ-
ent from (a) because under our assumptions thereis no loss in the sum
of values if the seller performs whenb>v; for in that case the buyer
would himself sell to the bidder.
Proof. We again apply part (b) of the Remark.To prove (a), note that
if the seller does not perform (sellinginstead to the bidder), his
wealth is k ÷ b and the buyer's is -k-r,so the sum is b -r.If the
seller does perform, his wealth is k and thebuyer's is v -k-r,so
the sum is v -r.Hence the sum is increased byfailing to perform when
b -r>v-ror when b >v.
To prove (b), note that if the seller doesnot perform, his wealth
is, as before, k +band the buyer's is -k-r,so the sum is b —r.
However, if the seller does perform, whereas the seller'swealth is
still k, the buyer's is now max(b, v) -k-r, so the sum is max(b, v) —
r.The difference between thesesums is b -max(b,v), wh.ich is nega-
tIve for v >band is 0 otherwise. Hence, for thesum to be maximized,
the only requirement is that the sellerperform when v >b.Q.E.D.
B.The case where prties are riskaverse
Let us very briefly consider thepossibility that parties might be
risk averse. The first observation thatshould be made is that prties'
attitudes toward risk do not alter the conclusions(in Propositions 1
and 2) whether it is Pareto efficient for theseller to perform. The
only effect of the parties' attitudes toward risk isto make it Pare to
efficient for rnney transfers to be madeex post. These transfers will
'be designed so as to accomplisha mutually beneficial sharing of risk.219
Thus, if the buyer is risk averse and the seller risk neutral, it
will be Pareto efficient for the seller to act as a perfect insurer of
the buyer; the transfers must therefore be such as to leave the buyer
with an unvarying level of wealth.22 In particu'ar, when under a Pareto
efficient contract the seller does not prform, he will py the yr
his expectancy.23
Conversely, if the buyer is risk neutral and the seller is risk
averse, it will be Pareto efficient for the yertoact as the perfect
insurer, and the transfers must therefore be such as to leave the seller
with an unvarying level of wealth. Hence, under a Pareto efficient
contract, the buyer will absorb the entire risk in production cost or
bids, as the case may be.24
If both the buyer and the seller are risk averse, then of course it
will not be Pareto efficient for either to act as a perfect insurer of
the other. The transfers made will, accomplish a sharing of risk in
accord with the parties' degrees of risk oversion, etc., and the situa-
tion will be an appropriate compromise between those described in the
last two paragraphs.
III. Contracts Are Incomplete
As stated in the introduction, the view that will be taken here is
that it is in the mutual interests of parties to leave contracts incoin-
plete. This will be so because the possible adverse consequences of
failure to provide for certain contingencies may not be sufficient to
justify bearing the sure costs of including terms for those contingen-
cies in the contract plus the expected costs of verifying their 'occur-
rence.10
A. The casewherep ties are riskneutral
Let us make the following
assumptions. First, the parties must
choose a set S of contingencies forwhich to write explicit Provisions:
Only i.f a contingency 0 is in S does thecontract specify whether or not
the seller shall perform; and letBS be the subset of contingencies
under which according to thecontract the seller does not perform. If 0
is not in S, then something outsidethe contract (e.g., contract.law,
Custom, renegotiation) determines what willhappen should 0 occur. (It
will of course turn out that 0 willbe in S only If the provision for 0
would alter what would otherwisehappen if 0 occurs.)
Second, there is a positive rate ofcost for each party of l/2c(0)
of providing for 0; for eachparty l/2fu(0)dO is therefore the cost of
S
including contingent terms. Third, there isalso a positive cost (8)
that the buyer would bear in orderto verify the occurrence of 0, and it
is assumed that he will doso whenever the contract calls for the seller
not to perform. Thus, if h(0) is theproLability density of 0, then
J(0)h(e)do is the expected verificationcost B
Under these assumptions, what will bea Pareto efficient selection
of contingencies for which to includeterrns.and a determination concern-
ing the seller's performance? In otherwords, what will be a Pareto
efficient incomplete contract (S,B, k)? The next Proposition answers
this question, making use of theeasily shown fact that an incocplete
Contract is Pareto efficient if andonly if S and B are chosen so as to
maximize the sumofthe buyer's and the seller'sexpected values. In
stating and proving the Proposition thefollowing additional terms are
needed: x(0),the sumofthe buyer's and seller's valuesgiven 0 if the
Contract provides for performance; y(0),thesumofvalues (exclusive of11
verification costs) given ® if the contract allows non-performance;
z(O),the sum of values given 0 if the contract does not providefor .25
Proposition 3. Under a Pareto efficient incomplete contract,(a) sup-
pose that there is a provision for a contingency0. Then the provision
will call for performance when x(0)y(0) -
Hence,(b) the set of contingencies for which there will be provi-
sions in the contract is
(1) S ={Ola(0)<h(0)[max(x(0),y(O) -(0))z(0)]}.
Note. The formula (ii) implies that the following factors militate a-
gainst making a provision for a contingency: a high costc(0)ofmaking
a provision, a low probability density h(0) of occurrence, ahigh cost
(0) of verification (should the provision call for non-performance),
and a high sum of values z(0) in the absence of a provision.
26
Proof. The sum of expected values is





Now suppose 0 is chosen in S. Then if 0 is also chosen in B,the sum of
integrands is-c(0) +y(O)
-(0);and if 0 is chosen in S—B, the sum of
integrands is -c(0) +x(0).Thus, since a Pareto efficient contract
maximizes (2), part (a) is true. And from part (a) and (2), part(b)
similarly follows. Q.E.D.
B.The case where parties are risk averse
If one or both parties are risk averse, although an analogue tothe
Proposition can be proved according to which the same qualitativeresults
are valid (a high a(0) or a low h(0) or a high (O)militate against12
includingU in S, etc.), there is no simple formuladetermining whether
a provision for a contingency will be made.27
IV.Remedies for Breach of Contract andRenegotiation as Substitutes
for Contingent Provisions
The last Proposition motivates interest in thequestion to be asked
here, namely, if there are no contingent terms whateverin a contract,
will the incentives to perform that are inherentin remedies for breach
and will the possibilities forrenegotiation result in outcomes which
approximate the Pareto efficient outcomes of acompletely specified
contract? As indicated in the introduction, theanswer to the question
will be a qualified, "Yes." This, andconsideration of the costs and
difficulties in making contingent provisionsjust discussed will help to
explain the observed incompleteness ofcontracts, the use of remedies
for breach, and resort to renegotiation.
Since the assumption here is thata contract contains no provisions
for contingencies, it will merely bea statement of the form "the seller
promises to deliver a good" or to "perform a service" andan agreement
over price. As before, the price will be assumedto be paid at the
outset. The parties will be assumed to beaware that there is a remedy
available for breach of contract28 and that theremay be an opportunity
for renegotiation if a problem arises.
As noted in the beginning, twotypes of rem..dy will be considered.
The first is fic performance, under whichthe seller must do what
he promised, and the second ispayment of an amount of money as deter-
wined by a measure. Three measures will be compared. Under the
first, the restitution measure, if the seller commitsa breach he must
return the payment k that he had received from thebuyer. Under the13
reliance measure, the defaulting seller must return the payment and
compensate the buyer for reliance expenditures, so the buyer, gets r +k
in damages; thus the buyer is put in the position he was in before he
made a contract. Under the expectationmeasure,the defaulting seller
must pay the buyer what the court perceives to be the expectancy; thus,
were the expectancy accurately estimated, the buyer would be put in the
position he would have enjoyed had the seller performed.29 Interest in
the possibility of the court's misperceiving the expectancy is due to
the commonly held belief that because the determination of the value of
performance to the buyer requires the court to answer a hypothetical
question, it is easy for errors to be made. By contrast, the determina-
tion of the contract price or of reliance do not require the courts to
engage in such speculation; the price paid and money spent in reliance
should usually be fairly readily assessed. Now let
u = courtTs estimate of the expectancy v
and
q(., u)=jointprobability density of u and other random
variables--either b or c, as specified,
where q is assumed to be positive when and only when u is in a non-
degenerate interval [u, u]. Moreover, it is assumed that v is contained
in (u, i)andthis interval is itself contained in [cr, ].Last,it is
assumed that u >r+k,in keeping with the idea that the court knows
that v must certainly be higher than r +k--thebuyer would never be
willing to make a contract if what he had to spend, r +k,was greater
than or equal to the value of performance, V.30
Inwhat follows, the behavior of the parties under the various
remedies. will be determined and compared with that under Pareto effi-
cient complete contracts. Also the factors that would make a particular14
remedy Paretoorto anther will be determined. Thedefinition of
this term in the present context isthat one remedy is Paretosuperior
to a second if givenany contract price and use of the secondremedy,
both parties would prefer to makesome adjustment in the price and to
employ instead the first remedy.
A. Thewhere ties areriskneutral
Thefirstsituation to be analyzed is that whereparties do not engage
in renegotiation of the contract becauseit is assumed to be toocostly
to do so.(Thus the seller decides aboutperformance only on the basis
of whether this would make him better
off given the buyerts remedy for
breach.) Then the more complicated
situation with renegotiation will be
analyzed.
1. pfmance andbreachwhen there is no renegotiation. Consider
initially production contracts.Under specific performance, the breach
set is by definition empty. Thus thereis too little breach relative to
the Pareto efficient breachset B cIc >v}; whenever productioncost
exceeds the expectancy, thereought to be breach but ther is not. The
expected value to the buyer of the contractunder specific performance
is
(3) Eb(sp)_k=v_r_k
and to the seller it is
(4) E5(sp) +k=-fcf(c)dc+k.
Under the restitutionmeasure, the breach set is B =cJc>k.But re S
k<v-r<v,for otherwise the buyer would not havemade the con-
tract.31 Thus B contains B*, and there is too muchbreach; whenever res15
production cost exceeds k and is less than v, there ought not to be
breach but there is. The expected values of the contract to the buyer
and the seller are, respectively,
(5) E(res) -kvPr[ctck} -r÷ kPr{ctc >k}
-k,and
(6) E(res) +k-fcf(c)dc -kPrtcc>k}+k.
(It should be noted here that k >a,otherwise the seller would not have
made the contract.32) Under the reliance measure, the breach set is
B =c1c>r+k},which contains B since r +k<v.33Thus there
re 1
is again too much breach (but, given k, less than under restitution).
The buyer's and seller's expected values are







Last, under the expectation measure, the breach set is Bexp ={c,ulc >u}
since the seller will default and pay the court's estimate u of the
expectancy when the production cost is higher. Thus, if u were accurate
and equalled v, Bexp would equal B* and breach would occur when it ought
to. However, if u is an underestimate of v, then there might be breach
when there ought not; and if u is an overestimate, there might be per-
formance when there ought not. The expressions for the buyer's and
seller's expected values are34
(9) Eb(exp) -k=vPrc,ulc <u
-r+ffuq(c,u)dcdu-k,and
tc>u}




Figure2 summarizes the relationship betweenbreach and performance
under the four remedies and undera Pareto efficient complete contingent
contract, and will help in comparing the remediesas to their mutual
desirability.
Proposition 4. In a production contract (a) thereliance measure is
always Pareto superior to the restitutionmeasure. However, the relation-
ship among the other remedies depends on thenature of the contractual
Situation: (b) The expectationmeasure is Pareto superior to the other
remedies if the estimate of the
expectancy is sufficiently precise (i.e,
if u and are sufficiently close tov).(c) The reliance measure is
Pareto superior to the other remediesif the problem of excessiveper-
formance under specific performance andunder the expectation measure
(due to overestimation of theexpectancy) is more important than the
problem of inappropriate breach.35 (d)Specific performance is Pareto
superior to the other remedies if the problem ofexcessive breach under
the expectation measure (due tounderestjn1atjon of the expectancy) and
under the reliance measure ismore important than the problem of excessive
performance.
Note. Because the reliancemeasure induces even more excessive breach
than the restitutionmeasure, part (a) is true.36And because the
expectation measure induces Pareto efficient breachif the expectancy is
accurately estimated, part (b) is clear. The othertwo results are
self-explanatory.
Proof.To demonstrate (a), we must show thatfor any price of a
contract under the restitutionmeasure, there exists a price k2 such
that both parties are better off underthe reliance measure. To do this
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proof.Let E(res)Eb(res) i-E (res) and definesimilarily E(rel),
E(exp), and E(sp); and observe that forany k such that r +kv,
r+k r+k
(ii) E(rel) -E(res)vPrc1k <cr +k}-fcf(c)dc=f(v -c)f(c)dc>0.
k k
In particular, this must be true atk1 since we noted before that under
the restitution measure the buyer wouldnot be wil1in to make a con-
tract unless r +k<v.Additionally, we have for any k
r+k





and this also must be true at
k1. Moreover,
(13) dE(rel)vf(r ÷ k) -(r+k)f(r÷ k) (v -r-k)f(r+k)>0 dk
fork<v- r, and
(14) d(E (rel) +k) -(r+k)f(r+k)+(r+k)f(r+k)-Pr{cjc>r+k}+1>0.
dk
Finally, since at k v -r
(15) Eb(rel) -k=vPrcIcv} -r÷ vPr{clc >v}-(v-r) 0,
we must have at k =v-r,E(rel) +k=E(rel).These facts justify
the relationship among the points abovek1 in Figure 3 and also our
having drawn E(rel) and E(rel) +kas rising and meeting above the
point v -r.Now if given the reliance measure is employed rather
than restitution, the seller is madeworse off; he moves from A to
E(rel) +k1.Suppose then that the price is raised tok2, which is the
point at which the seller becomes just as well offas he had been under








been, for Eb(rel) -
k2




Hence, if the price is raised a little abovek2, both buyer and seller
are made better off by use of the reliancemeasure.
To demonstrate (b), since thecontract price does not affect the
breach set and thus the sum ofexpected values under the expectation
measure, it suffices to prove that E(exp) exceedsE(sp) and E(rel) if u
and
are_sufficiently
close to v. Now E(exp)vPrcJcv} -r-fcf(c)dc
as u and u -v,whereas E(sp) and E(rel) are unaffected.Hence E(exp) —
f3
E(sp)
-v(1-PrcIcv}) + fcf(c)dcf(c -v)f(c)dc> 0.
V V
Also E(exp) -E(rel)-vPrcIr+ k < cvJ -fcf(c)dc=f(v-c)f(c)dc> 0
r+k r+k
since it was noted that under the reliancemeasure the buyer would not
be willing to make the contract unlessr ÷ k <v.
To show (c), let us firstcompare E(rel) assuming that k =0with
E(sp) (which is Independent of k). Then
(16) E(rel) -E(sp) -





The first term after the lastequal sign is positive and represents the
waste of excessive performance underspecific performance, while the
second term is negative andcorresponds to -the loss due to excessive
breach under reliance. Ourassumption will be that the first term is
sufficiently large to exceed the second. Nowconsider a contract with
price under which specific performance is theremedy for breach. To
prove that there is a price k2 such that bothparties would be better19
off under the reliance measure, consider Figure 4. Since our assumption
is that C >Band since from (13) E(rel) rises with k, we know that
D >B.And observe that at k2 the seller is just as well off under the
reliance measure as he was under specific performance at k1, but the
buyer is strictly better off since D -A>B-A.Consequently, at a
price slightly above k2 both parties will be better off under the re-
liance measure. The argument for Pareto superiority of the reliance







where the first term is positive, representing the relative gain when
there is appropriate breach under reliance but excessive performance
under the expectation measure, and where the second term is negative,
corresponding to the relative loss when there is inappropriate breach
under reliance and worthwhile performance under the expectation measure.
Employing, then, the assumption that the first term exceeds the second,
we can use a graph similar to that of Figure 3 to complete the argument.
To prove (d), because E(sp) does not depend on the contract price,









This will be positive if the first term, the cost of excessive breach
under the reliance measure, exceeds the second, the cost of excessive









which will be positive if the first term, the cost of excessive breach
under the expectation measure, exceeds the second, the relative cost of
excessive performance under specific performance. Q.E.D.
Consider now contracts for transfer of possession and assume ini-
tially that bids are made only to sellers. Then the situation is essen-
tially the same as it was for production contracts: Figure 2 still
applies (but with the axis representing bids rather than production
cost); there is excessive performance under specific performance, ex-
cessive breach under the restitution measure, etc. For completeness,
however, we will write the various expected values. Under specific
performance, they are simply
(20) Eb(sp) -k=v-r-k,and
(21) E5(sp) +k=k.
Under the restitution measure, since the seller defaults and sells to
the bidder when the bid b exceeds k, the expected values are





Similarly, under the reliance measure, the formulas are








When bids made to the seller are availableto the buyer also, some
of the buyer's expected values are changed sinceif he had the good he
would sell to the bidder whenever b >v.(Of course, the seller's
behavior and expected values are as before.) Tobe precise, under sped'-
fic performance,
(28) Eb(sp) -kvPrbjb v} ÷ fbf(b)db -r-k,
and under the expectationmeasure,




Under the restitutionmeasure, however, the buyer's expected value is
unchanged; since he will get delivery only when bk and since k <v
(otherwise it can be shown that he would not havebeen willing to make
the contract), the buyer will never wishto sell the good to the bidder.
Similarly, the buyer's expected value is unchanged under thereliance
measure.
With these formulas, the next resultmay be proved.
Propotion 5. In a contract for transfer ofpossession, (a) if it
is assumed that bids are made only to theseller, then the relationship
among remedies for breach is exactly as described (in Proposition 4) in
respect to production contracts. However, (b) if it is assumed that
bids are available to the buyer aswell, then specific performance is
Pareto superior to the expectationmeasure, which is Pareto superior
to the reliance measure, which is Paretosuperior to the restitution
measure.22
Note. As remarked, part (a) is true for reasons analogous to those
explaining the previous Proposition; and since the proof is virtually
the same as that of the Proposition (with (20)-(27) playing the role of
(3)-(1O)), it is omitted. With regard to part (b), it is obvious that
when bids are available to the buyer, specific performance is Pareto
superior to the other remedies. On the one hand, Proposition 2 (b)
states that the seller's behavior is actually Pareto efficient under
specific performance because there is no problem of excessive per-
formance; if the seller is delivered the good when the bid is higher
than the expectancy, he will sell it. On the other hand, under the
other remedies, there is a possibility that the seller will default when
the bid is less than the expectancy. And since the likelihood of this
is higher under the reliance measure than under the expectation measure,
and higher still under the restitution measure than under the reliance
measure, the relative ranking of the remedies is explained.
Proof. To prove (b), it suffices to show that E(sp)> E(exp) >E(rel),
for E(sp) and E(exp) do not depend on k. (We already know by appeal to
part (a) that the reliance measure is Pareto superior to the restitution
measure, since we observed that under these two measures neither the
buyer's nor the seller's behavior changes on account of the availability
of bids to the buyer.) Now, recalling that E(sp)E(sp)+E5(sp) and that
E(exp) and E(sp) are defined similarly, we have from (28), (21), (29),
and (27),
(30) E(sp) -E(exp)v(Prbbv}-Pr{b,ulbu, bv})
+fbf(b)db




asrequired. Also, from (23) and (24),
-
(31)E(exp) -E(rel)v(Prb, ujbu, bv} -Pr{blbr+k})




Note here that in combining terms toget the second equality, we made
use of the fact that u must exceed r +k,for we had assumed that u >
r+k.Q.E.D.
2.performance and breach whenthereis renegotiation. It will be
assumed here that the parties willengage in renegotiation if (given the
contingency) the resulting benefits would exceed the costs.Specif-
ically, it will be assumed that if the buyer and the sellerengage in
renegotiation, each will bear a positive cost t in theprocess; and they
will agree on whether the seller is to performor to be released on the
basis of which would maximize the sum of values(i.e., they will agree
onthe Pareto efficient outcome). Further, ifthey engage in renegotia-
tion, they will split equally the gain in the sum of values fromhaving
done so; this will be done by means of a sidepayment.37Last, they will
decide to engage in renegotiation if and only if theresulting increase
in the sum of. values exceeds the joint Costs of 2t(i.e., the decision
whether to renegotiate is Pareto efficient).
It will be seen that the pibility ofrenegotiation does not
alter the gualitative nature of the results of the lastsubsection;
Propositions 4 and S remain valid. This is because when therewasno
renegotiation, the mutual desirability of a remedy depended on how well
it functioned as a device to induce the seller to behave ina Pareto
efficient way; a remedy was undesirable to the extent that itresulted24
in Pareto inefficient breach or Pareto inefficient performance. In the
present case, such departures from Pareto efficiency under a remedy are
still undesirable: if a departure would be large, then the parties will
engage in the costly process of renegotiation; and if the departure
would not be so large as to justify renegotiation, the departure will be
observed to occur.In sum, then, the possibilites for renegotiation
mitigate but do not eliminate losses that would otherwise occur under
the remedies.
Consider for example the functioning of specific performance in
respect to production contracts. When there was no renegotiation, the
problem with this remedy was that if the production cost c exceeded the
expectancy v, enforced performance involved a loss to the parties of
c —v.In the present case, if c -vexceeds the costs of renegotiation
of 2t, the parties will find it worthwhile to bear the costs of that
process, and the result will be that the seller will pay the buyer for
release from his obligation to perform. Or, consider the remedy of
restitution. Before, the problem was one of excessive breach; if c
exceeded the price k but was less than v, there was a loss of v -c.In
the present case, if the loss v -cexceeds 2t, then the parties will
decide to renegotiate, and the buyer willpay the seller to perform.
Let us now describe precisely how the opportunity to renegotiate
affects the behavior of parties and the expected value formulas. This
will be done only for production contracts, as the situation forcon-
tracts for transfer of possession is similar andmay easily be under-
stood by analogy to the previous subsection. Under specific perfor-
mance, the situation is shown in Figure 5.As we just noted, the buyer
and the seller will renegotiate for release of the seller whenc —v>2t,per r
I
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or when c >v+2t;and the seller will pay the buyer v +1/2(c -v)
for his release.38Thus, the expected value formulas are





(33) E(sp) ÷ k -fcf(c)dc-f(v+l/2(cv))f(c)dc
a v+2t
-tPrlclc>v+2t}+k.
Under the restitution measure, since the seller can default andpay k,
the situation is as illustrated in Figure 6. Here,as remarked, the
parties will renegotiate only when there would be breach--when both
k <cand when the consequent loss v -cwould exceed 2t, that is, when
k .<c<v-2t.(Thus, if kv-2t,the parties will never renego-
tiate; as this was analyzed in the last subsection, we assume that
k <v-2t).Given that this occurs, under our assumptions the buyer
will pay the seller c +1/2(v -c)-kto perform.4° If cv -2t,
the seller will default and pay damages. Therefore, theexpected value
formulas are
v-2t
(34) Eb(res) -kvPr{cjc <v-2t}-r-5Cc+1/2(v -c)-k)f(c)dc
k
-tPr{clk<c<v-2t}÷ kPr{cjc v -2t}-k,and
v-2t v-2t




Underthe reliance measure, the situation is pictured inFigure 7 and is
similar to that under the restitution measure. There will berenego-
tiation when r +k<c<v-2t(we assume that r +k<v-2tto avoid- e.. r 'A & r Ce.. no
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the case treated before when there wasno renegotiation) and the buyer
will pay the seller c -r+1/2(v -c)-kto perform.Hence
v- 2 t








Last, under the expectation measure, the situationdepends on whether
the court's estimate u is within 2t ofv. If it is, there is never
renegotiation, and the seller will default andpay u when c >u.How-
ever, if u <v-2t,then Figure 8a applies. Here, there will bere-
negotiation when u <c<v-2tand the buyer will pay the seller
c —u+1/2(v-c) to perform;42 when cv -2tthe seller will commit
breach and pay damages. On the other hand, ifu v -2t,then the
relevant situation is shown in Figure 8b. In thisinstance, there will
be renegotiation when v +2t<cu and the seller will pay the buyer
+1/2(c -v)to be released;43 when cu the seller will default and
pay u in damages. It follows from our description of behavior under the
expectation measure that44
• (38) Eb(exp) -kv(Pr(clc v —2t}÷ Pr{c, uJ v -2t<cv +2t,cu})
—r—55Cc-u+l/2(v-c))q(c,u)dcdu —tPr{c,u\u<c<v-2t}
{u<c<v—2t}








c2k 5CiiOr of poditd coc-o Lcri biôs'






rQprru r rrc)j\c. E fleO±iii1c\ fc—j.
•1
Parormc breacond pedaiy k











Using these formulas, we show in the Appendix that parts (a) and (b) of
Proposition 4 remain true, leaving the verification of parts (c) and (d)
to the interested reader; and as remarked, it is straightforward to
determine the expected value formulas for contracts for transfer of
possession and to check that Proposition 5 remains valid.
B.The case where parties are risk averse45
In considering the role of remedies for breach as implicit sub-
stitutes for well specified contracts when one or both of the parties is
risk averse, the allocation of risk must be taken into account along
with incentives to perform. The general conclusions thatemerge from
considering this dual role o'f remedies are simple to state. First,
suppose that the buyer is more risk averse than the seller. Then, other
things equal, the case for specific performance is strengthened over
that for the expectation measure, the case for it is in turn strengthened
over that for the reliance measure, and the case for it is stengthened
over that for the restitution measure. The reasons for these conclu-
sions are of course that specific performance is by definition perfect
insurance for the buyer; the expectation measure provides only imperfect
insurance due to the courts' imperfect knowledge of the expectancy; and
the reliance and restitution measures leave respectively greatergaps in
coverage against loss of the expectancy (and create respectively greater
probabilities of such loss).28
on the other hand, thatthe buyeris better able to bear
risk than the seller. Then our conclusions4pendon the of contract
in ue st ion. In pp4tion contrac ts spec i f i c perfo nn an c eappearsto be
least desirable, and the expectationmeasure, the reliance measure, and
the restitution measures seem to besuccei\Tey more desiab1e remedies
on grounds of risk-sharing. Specific performance makesthe seller
absorb (or renegotiate to be released from) thepotentially great risks
associated with variation of the productioncost; the expectation measure
limits the risk to the (estimated)expectancy; the reliance and restitu-
tion measures limit the risk to loweramounts. Thus what is a mutually
desirable remedy from the point of view of risksharing may be an un-
desirable remedy from the point of view of thecreation of incentives to
perform. In tocontracts for transfer of possession, the situation
seems different; specific performanceappears to be most desirable, and
the pectation measure, the reliancemeasure, and the restitution
measure seem to be successively less desirable remedieson grounds of
risk sharing. Under specificperformance, there is, as is advantageous,
no variability in the seller's position--liegets his payment and delivers
the good which he has in hispossession to the buyer. Under the expec-
tation measure, there is variability in theseller's final position, for
he might. default, pay damages, and sellto a high bidder. Under the
reliance and restitutionmeasures, this variability is greater, since
the difference between a bid anddamages paid grows larger.
V.Comment
—
a. Our general point that it is in the mutualinterests of parties to
leave agreements incomplete and torely instead on various substitutes
for contingent terms is confirmed by considerationof a broad range of
type of agreement. Certainly parties making informalverbalcontracts29
typically omit to mention possible contingencies unless these are very
likely or very important; and even parties carefully drawing up formal
contracts frequently do not provide explicitly for many contingencies.
It is generally appreciated from the outset that if an unexpected event
occurs leading a party to wish to default on his contractual obligation,
the difficulties that then arise will usually be settled in a reasonably
satisfactory way through use of recognized excuses, renegotiation, or
remedies for breach of contract.46
b.Noreover, our particular results concerning the relative desira-
bility of remedies for breach of contract are consonant with two general
facts about their actual use.47 First, the expectancy is the favored
measure of damages, provided that it can be fairly accurately assessed.
(This is, of course, in accord with our result that the expectation
measure induces performance when it would be mutually desirable.) And
second, specific performance (rather than a damage measure) is employed
as the remedy for breach primarily for certain trpes of contracts for
transfer of possession, notably for contracts for the conveyance of
land. (This is in accord with our result on the mutual desirability of
specific performance as a remedy for breach of contracts for transfer of
possession when the buyer has access to bids made to the seller; and as
was explained, it also appears sensible on grounds of the allocation of
risk.)Footnotes
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1. The first systematic formal analysis ofdamage measures .for breach
is presented in Shavell 1)980); butsee extensions and additions
made in Rogerson [1980]. See also Kornhauser[1980]; and see Posner
[1977J for informal analysis of contracts andbreach that will be of
interest to economists.
2. The necessity of verification ofa contingency was first emphasized
by Radner [1968].
3.While this substitute for provisions is ofundeniable significance,
•it is subject to the important limitation thatit can be success-
fully employed only in respect to thosecontingencies that are
easily observed and for which the agreement that theparties would
have made can be confidently imputed.
4. The Contribution of thispaper to the formal literature on contracts
would appear to lie in the analysis ofcontractual incompleteness;
the distinctions drawn between productioncontracts and contracts
for transfer of possession; the considerationof specific perfor-
mance; the treatment of imperfect knowledge of thecourts; and.. the
allowance for costly renegotiation (butsee Rogerson [1980] on
costless renegotiation).2
5.Any non-monetary variable affecting the well-being of a party is
thus assumed to have a monetary equivalent.
As the level of initial wealth will have no bearing on the
analysis, initial wealth will be suppressed in the notation; thus it
will appear as if initial wealth is zero.
6. Thus issues concerning the effort devoted to search for contractual
partners are not studied here; for analysis of these issues, see
Diamond and Naskin [1979].
7. This is determined endogenously in Shavell [1980], where it is a
focus of interest.
8. This and other terminology to be introduced below conforms to stan-
dard usage; see for example Fuller and Perdue [1937] or Dawson and
Harvey [19771.
9.The function f and other functions to be defined will also be assum-
ed continuous.
10.Note that the bids are taken as exogeiious to the model. This sun-
plifying assumption is appropriate if one is thinking of cases in
which bids are made without real negotiation with the contracting
party. Were the asumption relaxed, it can be shown that the quali-
tative nature of the results would not be altered.
11.It will be seen that none of the results depend on this assumption,
and that only inessential modification of the proofs would be re-
quired to account for the possibility of a positive consumption
value (but one less than the expectancy (to be defined shortly)).
12.Thiswill be seen to imply that the buyer will never himself wish to
commit a breach (whereas he might if his expectancy suddenly fell);
onlythe seller will be led to do so. Relaxing this assumption3
would not change the qualitative nature of our results, as is evident
from Shavell [1980].
13. If the good or service were traded on a well—organizedmarket, the
only reason for parties to make a contract would be to share the
risk of fluctuations in the future market price; and because such
problems of pure risk-sharing are well understood, they are not
examined hee. However, Rogerson [1980], and Shavell [1981],an
earlier version of this paper, briefly discuss contracts ina market
setting -
14.This assumption is inessential. Were payment to be madeonly if there
was performance, the contract price could be raised as if tocompen-
sate the seller for the chance he would not be paid, and so forth.
See Shave].1 [1980].
However, if one or both parties are risk averse, we would not
wish to make the assumption (and do not--see subsection B). This is
because subsequent monetary transfers would clearlymatter; they
would allocate risk, about which risk averse partiescare, by defini-
tion.
15. B may not be unique; but when this is so it will be noted and there
will be no cause for confusion.
16.The proof of the following Remark is obvious and is therefore omitted
(but it is presented in Shavell [1981), and the proof of a similar
result is presented in Shavell [1980]).
17.This statement is not quite precise, for it does not matter what the
seller does if the sum of values is not affected by whether the
seller performs. In that case, we will adopt the Convention that
the seller performs; and we will adopt similar conventions lateron
in the paper without comment.4
18.This assumption seems appropriate if one is considering cases in
which bidders would find it costly to identify the contract buyer,
or when they would find it best to look elsewhere if the seller
reported that he was obligated to deliver to the contract buyer,
etc.
19.Were we to complicate the model so as to allow for such purchases,
it will be clear that the next Proposition would still be true.
This is because there would be a loss in the sum values if the buyer
purchased from the bidder rather than receiving delivery directly
from the contract seller; for it is natural to assume that the buyer
would have to pay more than b--what the seller received--to induce
the bidder to sell. (Noreover, the purchase would involve additional
transaction costs.)
20.It is also easy to show that the parties should be indifferent as
between making contracts with distinct Pareto efficient breach sets:
Suppose that B1 B are each Pareto efficient. Then for any con-
tract (B1, k1) we must show that there exists a k2 such that under


















21.Specifically, if we let S denote a contingency, then a complete con-
tingent contract is specified not only by k and B, but also by a
function, say g(O), indicating how much (positive or negative) the
seller is to pay the buyer given the contingency 0. It is easy to
show that a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency of a contract
(B, K, g(•)) is that B be such that for each 0, the sumofvalues is5
maximized. Thus, by the Remark, the choiceof B is the sameas when
parties are risk neutral. And given this choice of B, g must be
such as to share risk in a Pareto efficientway, that is, (as Borch
[1962] originally showed) the ratio of the buyer's marginalutility
to the seller's must be maintained constant over 0.
22. This is of course a well known aspect of Pareto efficient risk
sharing.
23. If this is true, the buyer will get hisexpectancy whether or not
theseller performs, so that the buyer's final wealth will be
constant (and will equal v -k-r).
24.For example, under a contract for transfer of possession, if it is
Pareto efficient for the seller to sell to a bidder, thebuyer will
get the proceeds from the sale.(Of course, because the seller
expects to give up these proceeds in such circumstances, he will
have received a higher contract price than otherwise.)
25.Thus z(O) might equal either x(O) or y(O), depending on what the
seller would do in the absence of a contingent term in the contract.
Also, z(O) might be less than either or both of x(O) and y(6) if
given 0 there would be costs involved in settling disputes.
26. SB ={o)es,0B}.
27.There is no simple formula because the decision whether to includea
particular contingency depends (as it did not in the risk neutral
case) on whether there are provisions for other contingencies. Such
interdependence may come about through the following kind of "wealth
effect": If provisions are made for other contingencies, a6
party's wealth will be lowered due to the costs f(0)dO. This could
S
inturn increase his need for "insurance" against an adverse 0 and
thus his desire to include a provision allowing for an appropriate
sharingof risk given 0.
28.With one exception, it will make no difference whether one thinks of
the parties as being aware of the remedy the courts will apply (the
interpretation made in the paper) or as having specified in the
contract which remedy (so called liquidated damages) will apply.
The exception concerns the expectation measure; see note 29.
29.If the reader wishes to consider the situation where the parties set
out in the contract the amount to be paid for breach, then it might
be appropriate to assume that uv sine the seller would often
have a better idea of the expectancy than the court (and, in any
event, we have assumed here that the seller knows v).
30.It can easily be shown that v >r+kmust hold for the buyer to be
willing to make a contract (i.e., for Eb -k>0)under any of the
remedies considered. See for example note 31 below.
31.For the buyer to make the contract, we must have Eb(res)k >0.
Thus, using the next equation, we have vPr{c)ck} -r+kPr{c}c>k}
—k>0or vPr{cjck} -r-kPr(clck}>0or (v -r)/Prclck}>
whichimplies that v -r>k.
32.Ifkci, the seller will commit breach with probability one under
restitution, so that the expected value of the contract to the
seller would be zero (and to the buyer it woul.d be negative). It
will also follow by similar reasoning that k must exceed c under the
other remedies as well, and we will not bother to mention this fact
again.7
33.This follows from the condition Eb(rel) -k>0by an argument
analogous to that in note 31.
34. In the double integral in (9), it will be convenient to indicate the
set over which integration is performed by the shorthand {c >uJ
rather than by {c, uc >u}or by upper and lower limits of inte-
gration. We will also employ similar shorthands in other integral
expressions.
35. The precise meaning of "the problem of excessive performance" and
"the problem of inappropriate breach" is best explained in the
proof.
36.As the reader who examines the proof will see, there is a complica-
tion in the argument showing part (a) (and (c)) due to. the fact that
under the reliance measure, the contract price affects breach be-
havior and thus the sum of expected values of the contract. (The
higher the price, the less frequent is breach and the higher the sum
of values.) This means that to show that the reliance measure is
Pareto superior to another measure, one must use the definition of
Pareto superiority directly; it does not suffice to demonstrate that
the sum of expected values is higher under the reliance measure.
37.The assumptions that they split the gain equally and that they bear
equal costs of renegotiation are not important to our results.
38. If we let z be the payment made by the seller for his release, then
the improvement in the buyer's position will be (z -t-r-k)-
(v-r-k)=z-t-v.But we assumed that the parties split
equally the gain in the sum of values from renegotiation, and these
gains are (c -v)-2t.Hence z must satisfy z -t-v=1/2
(c -v)-t,or z= v+l/2(c-v).(Note therefore that the higher8
the seller's cost of production would be, the more he pays the buyer
for release.)
39. In (32), the first term on the right hand side is the expected
benefit from performance, the third is expected payments made by the
seller when renegotiation occurs, and the fourth is the expected
cost of renegotiation. The other formu'as below are similarly
explained.
40.Let z be the buyer's payment. Then the improvement in the seller's
position if he does not default is (- c-t+k)-(k-k)
z -c-t+kand this must equal l/2(v -c)-t.Hence=c+
1/2(v-c)—k.
41.If z is again the buyer's payment, thenthe improvement in the
seller's position if he does not commit breach is (z —c—t+k)—
(k-(r+k))=- c-t÷ k +r,which must equal l/2(v -c)-t,
so z= c-r+l/2(v
-c)-k.
42. If zisthe buyer's payment, then the improvement in the seller's
position if he does not default is (- c—t+k)—(k—u)
z —c-t+u,which must equal 1/2 (v -c)-t,so z =c-u+1/2
(v -c).
43. Let z equal the seller's payment, so the buyer's improvement in
position if the seller is released is (z -t-r-k)—Cv-r-k)=
z - t-v,which must equal 1/2(c -v)-t.Thus z v +l/2(c-v).
44. The terms on the right hand side of (38) are the expected value of
performance, reliance, expected payments made to the seller to
induce him to perform (when the expectancy is significantly under-
estimated), the expected cost of such renegotiations, expected
payments received from the seller for his release (when the expec-
tancy is significantly overestimated), etc.9
45.On this case, see also Kornhauser [1980]; Polinsky [1981], and the
remarks in Shavell [1980].
46. See the well known article by tlacaulay [1963] for an interesting
discussion that emphasizes. the incompleteness of contracts and
settlement of disputes through renegotiation and other informal or
extralegal means.
47.Shavell [in process] relates the theoretical results of thispaper
to contractual practice and to legal commentators' views about
contract law.
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APPENDIX
verification of Proposition 4 when parties might renegotiate: To prove (a),
we may employ the argument given when the parties did not renegotiate. The
analogs of (11) and (12) are
(Al) E(rel) -E(res)2tPrc1k <cr +k}>0,and
v- 2 t











for the last two terms are clearly positive, and so is the first term.(To
see that the first term is positive, note that since kc r +k,the inte—
grand is greater than or equal to k +l/2(v-(r+k))-k-t=1/2(v
—Cr+k))-t.But this exceeds zero, for we had assumed v -2t>r+k.)
Also11
(A3) dE(rel)2tf(r+k) > 0.
dk
These inequalities justify a graph similar to that ofFigure 3, from which the
result follows.
To prove (b), note that as u and ->v,there is never any renegotiation--
Pr{uu < v -2tor u > v + 2t}0-- so that
(A4) E(exp) -v(PrcJcv -2t}+ Prcjv -2t< c < v + 2t, cv})
—r-fcf(c)dc =vPr(cjcv}—r —fcf(c)dc.
{cv-2t}Jjv-2t<c<v+2t, cv} {cv}
However, E(rel) and E(sp) are unaffected as U,u-*v.Hence,
v+2 t
(AS) E(exp) -E(sp)-vPrclv < cv + 2t} + fcf(c)dc
V
v+2t






+ 2tPr{clr + k < c < v -2t}=5(v-c)f(c)dc÷ 2tPr[c[r
v-2t
+ k < c < v -2t}> 0,
which establishes the result.
Similarly, parts (c) and (d) follow in a straightforward way from the
former proof.